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Abstract 
UK policymakers desire to see more and better jobs in the labour market mirrors 
deepening concern that the quality of much employment is poor, wages are low and 
opportunities to progress are limited. The result is social inequality, growing and 
highly persistent income inequality and a lack of social mobility. The focus of current 
policy is on the need to ensure that those at the lower end of the labour market invest 
in their human capital through re-engaging with learning, which is assumed to enable 
progress into better-paid employment. This paper argues that a set of mutually 
reinforcing factors reduces the incentives acting on individuals and in many cases 
employers, to participate and invest in education and training. Each of these factors, 
on their own, would be sufficient to cause problems at the lower end of the labour 
market. Acting in concert, as a mutually reinforcing matrix, they produce powerful 
reasons why many individuals perceive that the incentives to learn are weak. Our 
argument suggests that the fundamental causes of low pay and rotten jobs have been 
misdiagnosed and policy interventions that inject more workers supplied with lower 
level vocational qualifications into the labour pool are unlikely to produce a shock to 
the system that would be sufficient to engender lasting and widespread change. 
  
  1 
Introduction 
Two issues drive this paper. The first motivation for what follows is that UK 
policymakers need to worry about mass unemployment once again, but they have also 
been experiencing increasing doubts about the nature of and quality and rewards 
attendant upon, work and employment at the lower end of the labour market.  In part, 
this is because it has become apparent that many of the less attractive features and 
outcomes within the labour market do not seem liable to vanish of their own accord. 
In the mid-1990s and the early 2000s the UK government and many commentators 
and pundits in the Western world envisaged that as an era of unbridled creativity and 
knowledge-intensive working took hold, a workforce of knowledge workers who 
would command ‘authorship’ over their own work routines and activities would be 
created (Reich 1991, Michaels et al. 2001, Florida 2005, Leitch Review 2005 2006). 
As Tony Blair put it, ‘in a sense, a whole economy has passed away ... In the new 
knowledge economy, human capital, the skills people possess, is critical’ (Blair 2007: 
3). 
Although never willing to openly repudiate this sunny vision, at least some 
commentators (Toynbee 2003, Howarth and Kenway 2004) and those within the 
corridors of power came to doubt that this happy ending was likely to be either as 
assured or on as wide a scale as the more optimistic projections had once suggested. 
In part, this has been because it has become increasingly apparent that neither 
sophisticated models of ‘soft’ HRM (Coats 2009), nor the growth of the knowledge 
driven economy will be sufficiently widespread to ‘magic away’ bad jobs (Lloyd et al 
2008, Lawton 2009, UKCES 2010). As a result, in 2008/2009 Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit meetings and projects on ‘flexicurity’ and the workplace were instituted (in 
which one of the authors of this paper was peripherally involved). These activities 
offered a platform for the development of concerns within the heart of government 
about the wage and employment prospects of workers at the lower end of the labour 
market. 
Associated with this has been a growing dismay about low, static or even 
perhaps declining levels of inter-generational social mobility. Politicians across the 
mainstream parties have demanded an increase in the ability of the children from 
lower socio-economic classes to achieve better-remunerated jobs and higher social 
class destinations than their parents. The result is a strong desire on the part of 
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policymakers to find ways in which upward mobility within the labour market can be 
enhanced and for government policy to help create more and better jobs. As ever, 
more and better education and training provision is deemed the key ingredient to 
future success for those at the lower end of the labour market. Consequently, the 
education and training policy agenda, as a means of securing change, embodies large 
ambitions; however, these centre on long-standing problems, and looks particularly 
ambitious when being proposed in the context of a major recession and straitened 
public finances. 
The second issue that lies behind what follows is an interest in the profound 
shift in UK policy discourses relating to low paid work over the last 30 years or so.  
As noted above, the problem has not gone away, but the manner in which it is 
conceived and analysed has shifted quite profoundly. In the not too distant past a large 
body of academic and policy-related literature analysed the causes of persistent low 
pay in terms that suggested that the existence of ‘bad’ jobs was bound up with a set of 
structural and institutional factors such as the shape of product markets, competitive 
pressures and the lack or weakness of trade unions and collective bargaining 
institutions (see, for example, National Board on Prices and Incomes 1971, Field 
1973, Phelps Brown 1977, Mayhew and Bowen 1990). Skills and training either did 
not figure in this explanation for low quality jobs, or was only allocated a relatively 
small role within it. 
Over time, this traditional analytical standpoint has faded from view and been 
replaced by a much narrower analysis (and associated policy agenda) that ascribes 
low pay in large measure to deficiencies in the stocks of human capital held by those 
in lower end work.  Thus, the answer to low pay and to dead end jobs has therefore 
come to be focused upon a minimum platform of individual rights for workers, a 
National Minimum Wage (NMW), in-work tax credits for working parents to reduce 
child poverty and up-skilling for workers. The first three are in place but as the 
likelihood of any substantial further increases or strengthening of these measures 
appears relatively limited for the foreseeable future, the stress in public policy has 
come to rest more and more on up-skilling. 
What follows is an exploration of whether the elevation of skills and the policy 
agenda for education and training as the cause of and answer to, low pay and bad jobs 
offers an accurate analysis of the problem. In addressing these issues, the paper 
deploys a typology of the incentives acting on individuals to encourage them to learn 
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(Keep 2009a). This typology and its associated analytical framework can be used to 
explore the pattern and strength of the incentives to learn in any developed country 
and can cover the whole population or any segment thereof. In this instance, the aim 
is to evaluate how strong such incentives are for those who occupy or seem destined 
to occupy lower end jobs in the UK labour market. The proposition is then advanced 
that the existence of a matrix of mutually reinforcing factors reduces the incentives 
acting on individuals and in many cases employers, to participate and invest in further 
education and training. The paper concludes that the matrix reflects the fact that the 
chief causes of low pay and bad jobs often lie outside the area of skills. 
The Need for More Learning at the Bottom 
The UK has been plagued by repeated indications that its levels of participation and 
achievement by young people in post-compulsory education and training are lower 
than in the vast majority of other OECD countries (UKCES 2009). After many years 
of effort and the expenditure of much public money, initial participation has moved 
from low to middling, but achievement (at least as measured in whole qualifications 
and as achievement at Levels 2 and 3) continues to disappoint (Pring et al. 2009). 
This leads to arguments that too many young people are either unable to secure 
employment or progress within it and that poor schooling helps to create a permanent 
social underclass. For example, the leader of the national employers’ organisation – 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) – recently argued that our publicly funded 
school system produced results, ‘which we ought to be ashamed of’ and that this fed 
and was fed by ‘a culture of low aspiration’ (Curtis 2009). 
The answer is now deemed to lie in qualification reform, in public subsidy to 
encourage young people to remain in education and training1 and in moving to legally 
compel the young to remain in some form of learning until 18. In the last decade, 
policymakers have emphasised the need to ensure that those in the lower tiers of the 
labour market re-engage with learning and invest in their human capital in order to 
improve their employability (however defined) and to progress up the job ladder into 
better-paid employment. This has been motivated by a firm conviction that an 
individual’s stock of human capital is a (possibly THE) key determinant in their 
ability to acquire a job and hold onto and progress in employment (Leitch 2006). 
                                                 
1
 A good example is Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA). 
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Managerial and professional workers seem to be offered a considerable amount 
of opportunity to acquire new skills or enhance existing capacities, whereas young 
people (Ball et al. 1999) and adult workers in lower end occupations appear much less 
likely to receive this kind of investment from their employer (Leitch Review 2005 
2006). Although this situation has given rise to much official anguish among 
policymakers in the UK, it should be noted that a broadly similar pattern of access to 
adult training appears across much of the developed world, including the 
Scandinavian countries that are otherwise regarded as the poster children of lifelong 
learning. Examples of UK policy statements exhorting more to be done for lower end 
adult workers include HM Treasury (2002), DfES (2005) and Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit (2008). 
In addition, wider claims have been made about the need: 
• for more and better education and training in order to empower individuals 
within the labour market in a way that replaces the need for collective 
forms of worker organisation (see Blair 2007); 
• to generate wider cultural change, with schools acting as the ‘power 
supply’ for aspiration in the communities they serve (Wintour and Stratton 
2008); 
• to reduce the number of people in low paid employment; and 
• to power social mobility (Blair 2007, Brown 2010). 
As a result, the expectations about what education and training policy can deliver 
have expanded very considerably (Keep 2006, Keep and Mayhew 2010). 
The Incentives to Learn – a Framework 
In trying to gauge how likely the current policy is to promote more learning among 
both young people and adult workers and in turn how likely such learning would be to 
solve the problem of low paid, dead end work, this paper deploys a typology of 
incentives to learn and a framework for their analysis that has been elaborated in an 
earlier SKOPE Monograph (Keep 2009a). The section that follows tries to summarise 
the key points of this framework. 
Incentive generation 
The various incentives to invest time, energy and money in learning are generated 
through two sets of forces: 
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1. The Pull of opportunities, both to learn and to then utilise that learning, 
either for personal pleasure (intrinsic reward), to benefit others (altruistic 
reward), or for tangible gain through some form of paid employment; and 
2. The Push of resources, expectations and social relationships, which enable 
and sustain learning.2 
These push and pull factors will singly or in conjunction give rise to incentives of 
varying strength that will in turn impact upon and motivate different individuals to act 
in different ways. There are two main types of incentive: 
• Type 1 (internal) incentives are generated inside the education and training 
system and create and sustain positive attitudes towards the act of learning 
itself and towards progression within each student or trainee. In other 
words, many Type 1 incentives produce, or are the result of, intrinsic 
rewards generated through the act of learning. 
• Type 2 (external) incentives are created in wider society and within the 
labour market and the rewards they give rise to are external to the learning 
process itself. 
The strength of the effects being induced will vary within and between Types 1 
and 2. Wiseman et al. (2008) provide a useful overview of how extant research 
identifies and maps the different dimensions of Type 1 and 2 incentives. Type 2 
incentives tend to be structurally embedded in and mediated through the fabric of 
society, the labour market and wider economic structures. This, coupled with the 
interaction of the economic and social dimensions, often makes Type 2 incentives 
relatively powerful compared to many Type 1 incentives. The following illustrate the 
different forms that Type 1 and 2 incentives can take: 
Examples of Type 1 (internal) incentives 
• Intrinsic interest and pleasure in learning and curriculum design and 
pedagogy fashioned to deliver and enhance this. 
• Forms and methods of assessment that are designed to encourage further 
participation rather than to sort students or ration access to next level of 
learning (i.e. formative rather than summative assessment). 
• Opportunities for progression in education and training that are relatively 
‘open’ and are not tightly rationed. 
• Institutional cultures within the education and training system that nurture 
potential and celebrate achievement. 
                                                 
2
 These resources cover a range of tangible and intangible elements, including financial support to 
students (from whatever source(s) and social, for example, well-educated parents who encourage the 
child to learn through support, exhortation and example providing ample opportunities through a 
supply of educational toys, visits to museums and books. 
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Examples of Type 2 (external) incentives 
• Wage returns/premia to particular types and levels of qualification. 
• Other benefits to particular higher status/higher qualification entry 
professions and occupations (e.g. intrinsic job interest, opportunities to 
travel, etc). 
• Career progression and promotion opportunities accessible within 
particular occupational labour markets/employers. 
• Social status attendant on particular qualifications, career pathways and the 
earnings they generate. 
• Cultural expectations within society or particular ethnic or class-based 
segments therein, concerning the value of learning and qualifications and 
for young people the parental pressure to achieve that this in turn supports. 
• Labour market regulation that makes the acquisition of certain levels and 
types of qualification and learning experience a prerequisite for access to 
particular jobs/occupations. 
• For adult learners there are also a wide-ranging series of non-economic 
benefits that relate to satisfaction/enjoyment in family life and sporting, 
cultural, political and voluntary activities that can be gained through 
applying new skills, knowledge and expertise. 
The evidence suggests that positive and negative incentives tend to cluster 
around certain kinds of jobs. Higher status and higher paid employment, often 
requiring substantial education and training, generate much stronger and mutually re-
enforcing incentives to learn. Such jobs are usually more intrinsically interesting, 
provide opportunities to develop a career and perhaps to travel and have a higher 
social status. They often also demand that employees undertake continuing 
professional development (CPD) and training in order to remain employed and to 
progress within the profession or company (Sargent and Aldridge 2002). By contrast, 
low paid employment is often highly repetitive, offers less pleasant working 
conditions, with limited discretion and intrinsic interest, providing few incentives for 
further education and training and few real opportunities for progression (Lloyd et al. 
2008, Lawton 2009). Those doing such work often see little point in training, since it 
is outside their experience, their employer does not require higher skills and the 
opportunities to progress are circumscribed (Crowder and Pupynin 1993). 
Furthermore, the role of prior education and training and qualifications in accessing 
such employment is often patchy and weak (Spilsbury and Lane 2000, Jackson et al. 
2002, Bunt et al. 2005, Newton et al. 2005, Bates et al. 2008). 
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At the same time, incentives will vary in intensity across space. Some local 
and regional labour markets offer very different patterns of opportunity (in terms of 
wages and the range of jobs on offer) from others (Green and Owen 2006) and this 
situation may feed back into consequent patterns of choice about post-compulsory 
participation in education and training (see, for example, Gutman and Akerman 2008, 
Wiseman et al. 2008: 28). 
Under New Labour there was an increasing reliance on public subsidy to act in 
the absence, or instead, of Type 2 incentives generated by other actors, particularly in 
terms of providing a substitute for powerful signals from the labour market to invest 
in post-compulsory learning (Keep 2005). Education Maintenance Allowances 
(EMAs), Learning Agreements and Adult Learning Allowances (ALAs) are three 
such examples. These subsidy-based incentives, generated within the education and 
training system and funded by government can be labelled Type 1b incentives.  It 
should be noted that there are commentators who view their extension as an important 
means of supporting the move to compulsory participation in learning to the age of 18 
(see Fletcher et al. 2007, Corney 2009). 
At the same time, some policymakers have argued that by increasing state-
funded education and training provision, a sufficiently massive increase in skills 
supply can be created that will lead to a change in companies’ product market 
strategies catapulting the economy to a higher skills equilibrium. In turn, the demand 
for (and the rewards that accrue to) skills – higher Type 2 incentives – will increase 
thus creating a virtuous circle (see HM Treasury 2002). It is open to question how 
believable such a scenario really is. It is possible to argue that, in general, the 
causality runs in the opposite direction: the structure of demand dictates levels of 
provision and the demand for learning (see Fevre et al. 2000, Delorenzi and Robinson 
2005: 26-39, Keep et al. 2006). 
A Negative Set of Mutually Reinforcing Factors 
Pring et al. (2009) highlight the poor performance in both initial and continuing 
(adult) participation and achievement in education and training. What follows 
suggests that this is because of a matrix of factors that reduce the incentives acting on 
individuals and some employers, when contemplating investing in education and 
training and the pay-offs that accrue to learning (in terms of better pay, promotion and 
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more interesting work). Many of these factors are deeply embedded within and 
reinforced by, cultural expectations and norms and by features of the labour market 
and its regulation within the UK. These factors are explored below. 
1. Weak occupational identities and limited skill requirements 
Broad conceptions of the skill needed to undertake an occupation in the UK are 
lacking in defining the skills required to capably undertake a wide range of jobs. 
Moreover, the notion of an occupation at the bottom end of the labour market is 
somewhat of a misnomer. Research from work conducted in UK call centres, 
hospitals, hotels, food processing and retail on low skill, low wage work suggests that 
employers and employees regard the positions at the lower end as jobs with job tasks 
and workers are recruited to perform a specific job, which in turn can be reduced to a 
bundle of fairly closely defined tasks (Lloyd et al. 2008). For example, one meat-
processing worker described his job as: 
My job is doing this: I have to bend down – I have five or six hundred 
pieces to do, have to bend down six hundred times, pick it up six 
hundred times, put it in the machine six hundred times. All six hundred 
times, take it out, pick it up, turn it around, clip it six hundred times. 
Pick it up, put it in another container six hundred times. (James and 
Lloyd 2008: 231). 
Furthermore, the room attendants, retail workers and call centre workers in that 
research, although varying in the degree of discretion they felt in their job, if placed 
on a spectrum with no discretion on the left-hand side and a lot of discretion on the 
right hand side, would all have been left of centre. Clarke and Winch (2007: 15) 
iterate the difference between an occupation on the continent and its counterpart in 
England when contrasting the UK and Germany: 
In Germany, for example, VET [vocational education and training] 
represents a system of ‘qualification’ to provide a given quality of 
labour, a system based on social partner consensus and integration into 
the state apparatus. ‘Skills’ and qualifications are socially constructed, 
collectively negotiated and recognized and are bound up with the value 
of labour under legal obligation, a value in turn reflected in the 
collectively agreed wage and associated with the potential as well as 
the responsibility to fulfil the particular tasks and activities agreed 
within a given Beruf. The result, though maintaining a divide between 
academic and vocational, is that VET has a higher status than it has in 
a country such as Britain and that the hairdresser, the carpenter or 
nurse are accorded more responsibility to plan, carry out and control 
his or her own work. 
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2. Narrow conceptualisations of vocational skill and learning 
This leads to a narrow conception of vocational skill and the type of vocational 
education and training necessary to create these skills. In many instances in the UK, 
the vocational qualification (and the course of learning that is associated with it) is 
focused quite tightly on preparing the individual to undertake that particular job, with 
little wider learning that might form a basis for future learning or for labour market 
progression, such as to supervisory levels. For example, the apprenticeship offered by 
McDonalds in the UK offers employees the opportunity to ‘wrap’ or ‘brand’ a 
discreet set of identified work tasks or functions (Fuller and Unwin 2008: 18) from 
the Level 2 Multi-skilled Hospitality Services NVQ/SVQ Framework. The units of 
the National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) form a set of identified tasks that would 
ordinarily be employed in the employees every day activities (see below). Whilst 
there is possibly the opportunity for some progression within McDonalds, taking into 
consideration the narrow range of tasks that can be completed in the work processes 
available, it is unclear how this qualification will provide the opportunity for industry 
recognition and wider progression into an occupation. 
Unlike many Northern European countries, the luxury of a substantial element 
of general education within lower level vocational courses is often lacking in the UK 
(Green, A.  1998). Moreover, when there has been an attempt to combine elements of 
general education, for example key skills in apprenticeships, the type and level is not 
comparable to the general education mandatory in vocational education on the 
European continent. For instance, an apprenticeship in the UK at Level 2 often only 
requires (industry dependent) the key skills of communication and application of 
number to be completed at Level 1. 
In what could be described as a last ditch attempt to provide vocational skill 
and learning incorporating general education, UK policymakers introduced the 
Diplomas in 2008. Initially thought of as a successor to General National Vocational 
Qualifications (GNVQs) they were developed by the respective Sector Skills Councils 
(SSCs) to be delivered in secondary schools ‘as occupationally related with relevant 
work experience’ (Pring et al. 2009: 155). It is too early to say how successful 
Diplomas have been in bridging the academic/vocational divide; however, take-up has 
been disappointing with less than 12,000 of the anticipated 40,000 students 
undertaking Diplomas in their first year of inception and according to the Sutton Trust 
  10 
only 30 per cent of teachers thought the Diploma was useful for university entrance 
(BBC website, 6 April 2009). 
The outcomes of this inheritance are far from benign. The lack of a substantial 
component of the general education within the vocational stream of provision makes 
it harder for those whose initial educational experience was in the vocational stream 
to subsequently return to academic studies (for example, via entry into higher 
education). Even though policy supports progression from the vocational route to 
further education, the take-up is low. Pring et al. (2009: 154) show there was an 
increase from 18 per cent to 25 per cent in the proportion of students entering higher 
education (HE) via the vocational route between 1995 and 2004; however, the 
proportion dropped from 14 per cent to 10 per cent when vocational qualifications 
alone were taken into account. The authors conclude the increase is due ‘to students 
combining vocational and general qualifications, something which in itself may 
enhance opportunities for progression to HE, but which does nothing to confirm the 
status of vocational qualifications as entry routes in their own right’. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the work-based learning route is also a 
difficult way to secure progression to higher education: Advanced Apprenticeships 
have a very low rate of two to four per cent movement from the workplace to HE 
(Seddon 2005). Pring et al. (2009: 125) succinctly summarise the problem when they 
state: 
Moreover, the government’s approach to reform reproduces divisions 
between academic and vocational learning, despite the claim that the 
Diplomas themselves will lead to more mixed study. These points 
taken together suggest a repeat of the mistakes of the early 1990s when 
reform was concentrated on GNVQs, as an alternative to A-Levels and 
GCSEs, rather than on transforming the 14-19 system as a coherent 
whole. 
3. Competence-based vocational qualifications 
As suggested above, a related set of problems arises from the UK’s adoption in the 
mid-1980s of a competence-based form of vocational skill certification – NVQs. The 
methodology tended to create qualifications specified on the basis of a lowest 
common denominator that employers in an industry could agree upon. One of the 
impacts of NVQs is that they encode a narrow and shallow conception of the skills 
required to undertake an occupation/job and enable policymakers to confuse the 
accreditation of prior learning (which NVQs were specifically designed to facilitate) 
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with an opportunity to acquire a substantially higher level of new skills (Ofsted 2008). 
Furthermore, many NVQs appear to lack much in the way of substantive learning 
content. Both NVQs and key skills have being pilloried by employers (James 2006) 
and educationalists (Grugulis 2002) who, on the whole, value the process of time it 
takes to acquire skill and knowledge. Moreover, a 2006 Department of Education and 
Skills (DfES now the DCFS – Department for Children, Families and Schools) survey 
showed that even after 20 years only 45 per cent of companies had any useful 
understanding of NVQs, only one sixth understood the equivalence between NVQs 
and academic qualifications and one in 20 said they would avoid recruiting potential 
employees with NVQs (Pring et al. 2009: 125). Research also indicates that the wage 
returns to some lower level NVQs, even when acquired via the apprenticeship route, 
is limited (Dickerson and Vignoles 2007, Jenkins et al. 2007, McIntosh and Garrett 
2009). This is discussed further below. 
Overall, there are good reasons to be concerned about the utility of some of the 
vocational qualifications that we currently have in the UK. Public policy sees the 
solution to any concerns as resting with attempts to allow employers (via their Sector 
Skills Councils) to refine the occupational standards for their industry/sector and 
choose which vocational qualifications should be eligible for public funding, with the 
explicit aim of reducing the overall number available. The difficulty with this 
approach is that it is entirely possible for vocational qualifications to meet the short-
term needs of employers for task-specific skills for jobs, as they are currently 
constituted today, without such qualifications offering: 
• Economic empowerment (via scarce and valued skills) and a significant 
wage premium; 
• Coherent packages of learning and understanding upon which subsequent 
learning development, career change and labour market progression can be 
built; 
• Wider learning and understanding that goes beyond the immediate bundle 
of job tasks around which the vocational qualification has been 
formulated; and 
• Support for the individual in developing their roles as citizens and 
members of wider communities that bring with them roles outside the 
workplace (for example, as parents). 
The cumulative inheritance that forms the present day system offers a 
profoundly inadequate platform for initial education and training ‘formation’ and 
suggests that going beyond the short-term needs of employers may be a vital 
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component in reformulating vocational certification. If this kind of learning and 
certification was all that was on offer to the offspring of the economic and politically 
powerful, it seems reasonable to assume that it would be swiftly reformed, since it 
stands in stark contrast to the ‘gold standard’ model of learning towards which their 
children are destined. 
On the other hand, this does not suggest that qualification reform, of itself, 
holds the primary answer to the policy paradox outlined above; however, progress is 
unlikely if we do not confront the impoverished nature of the system of vocational 
qualifications that we developed and ‘perfected’ over the last quarter of a century. The 
current system in the UK both reflects and supports power imbalances and 
inequalities in our labour market and its reform is thus an important component of any 
attempt to make substantial progress in tackling the problems outlined at the start of 
this paper. 
4. Weak and limited labour market regulation 
Labour law remains a largely un-devolved issue within the UK – power and 
responsibility reside in Westminster and Whitehall and not with the devolved 
administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – and the UK government is 
still keen to trumpet the fact that it possesses one of the least regulated and therefore 
‘flexible’ labour markets in the developed world. A consequence is that the coverage 
of licence to practice in the UK labour market remains low compared to that in many 
other developed countries (for example, the USA at state level, Canada, Australia, 
Germany and Austria). As a result, the overall strength of Type 2 incentives to 
acquiring qualifications in order to enter various occupations is greater in these 
countries and may explain why many OECD countries have a higher stock of 
qualifications at particular levels (usually Level 3) in their workforces than in the UK 
(Keep 2005). This outcome may have little to do with underlying efficacy of their 
education and training systems or the Type 1 incentives they generate, it simply 
reflects the impact of stronger Type 2 incentives created via licence to practice 
regulation in the labour market. 
Plainly, licence to practice regulation provides what might be termed an 
absolute incentive to learn, in that it creates an unavoidable requirement to follow a 
particular course of learning and/or acquire a particular qualification (Keep 2009a). 
As Gospel and Lewis (2010) report, in the instance of social care workers, the arrival 
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of licence to practice regulation appears to have had beneficial effects on levels of 
training (and rather unsurprisingly, levels of qualification), though the bulk of the up-
skilling and certification costs for this have been met by the state not by employers. 
What licence to practice has not done is much to raise the pay of those working in 
such jobs and the wage premium for holding the required type and level of 
qualification has been small. Nor had licence to practice yet demonstrated much 
impact on the way labour was being deployed or managed, with little sign of more 
sophisticated people management/HR practices or policies being put in place (Lloyd 
2005). 
It should be noted that licence to practice regulation has gradually undergone 
some extension in recent years in the UK (see Cox et al. 2009). In some cases, this 
has occurred via government intervention in a particular segment of the labour 
market, such as in the care sector (Gospel and Lewis 2010). In others, it is due to the 
action of statutory authorities or other sources of intervention in support of licence to 
practice: 
• Magistrates – who have required qualifications for ‘door wardens’ when 
licensing nightclubs, pub and bar management qualifications before 
granting sale of alcohol licences for bars; 
• Health and Safety Executive (HSE) – who have required safe working 
practices certification for anyone working on track maintenance and repair 
on the railways; 
• EU regulation, for example of coach drivers, with a requirement for 
mandatory CPD for such staff; 
• customers such as the purchasers of large building projects in the 
construction trade; and 
• trade and employer bodies who have sought to raise the standing of their 
occupation or trade via a voluntary qualification requirement code (for 
example, the fitness industry, see Lloyd 2005). 
Nevertheless, the coverage of licence to practice in the UK labour market 
remains low compared to many other developed countries and as a result there is 
strong evidence (see Keep and James 2010) that the hold that qualifications have on 
the recruitment process in many sectors and occupations at the lower end of the labour 
market (such as retailing and hospitality) is limited or non-existent (see below). 
The UK Commission on Employment and Skills (UKCES)3 has been 
investigating what forms of policy intervention might help raise the overall level of 
                                                 
3
 An employer-led UK-wide policy body established in 2008 by the four UK national governments. 
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collective employer investment in skill in the UK (see Cox et al. 2009, Devins et al. 
2009). One intervention (alongside a range of other measures) whose viability and 
popularity was explored with a range of stakeholders was an extension of 
occupational licensing. There was some enthusiasm for this kind of intervention 
(Devins et al. 2009), but it was deemed to be relevant only for a small number of 
sectors and/or occupations where issues of public or customer safety were highly 
visible. In the foreseeable future, it seems likely that very large swathes of lower end 
employment will continue not to be regulated by any form of licence to practice and 
that if anything there will be continuing pressures, not least from employers (CBI 
2009), to maintain as de-regulated a labour market as is possible in the interests of 
competitiveness. 
5. Recruitment, selection and the wage effects of vocational qualifications 
For there to be strong incentives to engage in formalised learning, it would be 
necessary for the labour market to be structured and regulated in such a way that 
qualifications have a strong hold over recruitment and selection decisions across the 
entire occupational spectrum. Furthermore, lower level qualifications should either be 
an essential pre-requisite for gaining employment in a particular sector or job, or to 
generate significant positive wage premia for those holding them. Unfortunately, in 
the lower reaches of the UK labour market this is often not the case. 
The hold that a large raft of lower level vocational qualifications have upon the 
recruitment and selection process is weak, patchy and limited, often because many of 
the social and generic ‘skills’ that employers are looking for are uncertified and 
because the formal skill levels needed in many lower end jobs are so limited (see 
Spilsbury and Lane 2000, Jackson et al. 2002, Miller et al. 2002, Bunt et al. 2005, 
Newton et al. 2005, Bates et al. 2008 and Shury et al. 2008). The widespread use of 
informal methods of recruitment and selection, such as word of mouth 
recommendation, further serves to weaken the role and impact of qualifications (Keep 
and James 2010). 
Partly as a result of this situation, the wage returns to acquiring many lower 
level qualifications, particularly vocational qualifications, are generally poor (Dearden 
et al. 2000, Wolf et al. 2006). The evidence is complex, fairly depressing and 
reasonably consistent although recent re-estimations produce marginally better results 
(McIntosh and Garrett 2009). Unsurprisingly, the wage boost associated with 
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acquiring qualifications rises with the level of the qualification (Vignoles and 
Powdthavee 2006). The earnings returns to vocational qualifications are generally 
lower than those to academic qualifications at every level and there is considerable 
variation of returns to different types of vocational qualification at the same level: 
NVQs usually fare less well than other offerings, such as City and Guilds (Dearden et 
al. 2004, McIntosh and Garrett 2009). As Johnson et al. (2009: vi-viii) note in their 
review of the evidence on employee demand for skills, 
… evidence suggests that returns to accredited training at the lowest 
levels of qualification tend to be relatively low. This is likely to 
influence low-skilled individuals’ decisions to invest in skills 
development … policy needs to address the finding that the financial 
returns to learning/skills/qualifications appear to be lower and less 
certain among lower-skilled and lower-qualified groups. 
Despite these inconvenient facts, policymakers have continued to place heavy 
reliance on selective and partial use of the data as the means to encourage 
participation in post-compulsory learning (National Skills Forum 2006, Leitch 
Review 2005, 2006). There is a strong presumption that if actors were to become 
better acquainted with the existing evidence on monetary incentives (see Spielhofer et 
al. 2006 on their importance to young people) this would be sufficient to motivate 
them to invest far more into their skill acquisition, thereby producing the desired ‘step 
change’. 
Indeed, given the wage returns on some lower level vocational awards it could 
be argued that current levels of participation in initial education and training are 
actually higher than a rational response to the labour market incentives would dictate 
(Keep 2005). A fact perhaps now surreptitiously acknowledged by policymakers 
following their decision to make learning to the age of 18 a legal requirement. In other 
words, in the end the incentives to achieve the desired goal by voluntary means were 
accepted to be insufficient and legal compulsion seen as the only remedy. 
6. Limited opportunities for progression 
Policymakers are keen to see two outcomes from education and training with regards 
to progression and it is unclear that either expectation is well founded. The first is for 
education and training to provide a means of securing progression out of bad jobs. 
Although we have limited knowledge about progression out of low paid employment 
in the UK, the available data does not give rise to great optimism. The research 
suggests that opportunities for progression are limited in terms of the proportion of 
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the workforce who can hope to move up the job ladder (Grimshaw et al. 2002, Lloyd 
et al. 2008, Ray et al 2010, Metcalf and Dhudwar 2010) and also the scale of the 
career and wage benefits that such upward mobility gives rise to (Atkinson and 
Williams 2003, Green et al. 2004, Hoggart et al. 2006). The bulk of low-end jobs are 
dead ends, with only a very small proportion of workers able to progress more than a 
single rung up the occupational ladder. 
Furthermore, the attenuation of internal labour markets (Grimshaw et al. 
2002), the increasing use of agency workers (Lloyd et al. 2008) and the flattening of 
hierarchies all mean that the chances of progression, both within the individual firm 
and in many occupational groups, is limited (Metcalf and Dhudwar 2010). These 
problems are being made worse by the downward cascade of graduate labour (Brown 
et al. 2003, Boden and Nedeva 2010), which is starting to occupy many of the first 
line supervisory roles that, in times past, shop floor workers could have aspired to fill 
by moving upwards (Keep and Mayhew 2004, James and Lloyd 2008). 
The second outcome is to have higher levels of inter-generational social 
mobility through a better-educated inflow of young people into the labour market. 
Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) make a cogent case for the main motor of such 
advancement to be centred on changes in the occupational labour market (a growth in 
white collar, professional, managerial and associate professional jobs) rather than 
educational attainment per se. They also note that, in a world where the supply of 
good jobs is finite, if we are to increase upward social mobility by children from 
lower class backgrounds, the corollary is liable to be the need for downward 
occupational mobility on the part of children from better-off backgrounds. This 
difficulty is heightened by the fact that, despite all the optimistic projections of a more 
knowledge driven labour market of the future, in reality the proportion of low paid 
jobs in the UK labour market (about 22 per cent) is unlikely to fall at all this side of 
the year 2020 (Lawton 2009). Goldthorpe and Jackson’s advice is to reduce attention 
on aspiration and social mobility and instead think harder about how labour market 
outcomes might be made to have less polarised income outcomes, that is greater wage 
equality and how bad jobs might be made better (see also Hickman 2009). 
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Complex and Uncertain Incentive Patterns 
The structures and circumstances outlined above work in ways, through the push and 
pull of different factors, that mean the pattern and strength of the incentives acting on 
learning decisions is potentially complex, uncertain and even perhaps daunting (see 
for example, Jenkins et al. 2007). For instance, the labour market impacts of the 
acquisition of a particular qualification often vary according to: 
• The age of the learner; 
• Their gender; 
• The level of qualification; 
• Subject and occupation (if any) to which it is related; 
• Type of qualification/awarding body; 
• Location in which the learning takes place (e.g. workplace versus non-
workplace) and the status and standing of both the learning provider and 
the institution or body providing the education or training; and 
• Who pays for it – low-level vocational qualifications paid for by the 
individual’s employer appear to generate higher returns than those funded 
from other sources. 
Moreover, the vast bulk of publicly available data on the wage premia associated with 
particular types and levels of qualification is expressed as an average.  Very little 
information is vouchsafed about the levels of dispersion around this average, which 
can sometimes be considerable. 
Another factor adding to complexity and uncertainty is the fact that it is 
participation in learning that imposes costs and requires investment and participation 
is not the same thing as achievement. In other words, a student or trainee can 
participate in learning but fail to achieve the desired outcome or qualification (see, for 
example, Villeneuve-Smith et al. 2007:6). In such cases, the investment made, may be 
either totally or partially wasted. English policymakers have an unhealthy tendency to 
slide from participation to achievement as though the one more or less guarantees the 
other (see, for instance, DfES 2007, DCSF/DIUS 2008). 
Overall, weak and complex information (Cabinet Office 2008), coupled with 
uncertainty about the scale and likelihood of a sufficient return on the investment of 
scarce time, energy and money by individuals at the lower end of the labour market 
makes decision-making difficult.  Those at the lower end of the labour market may 
well be more risk averse as their resources are constrained (they have lower incomes 
and are less likely to secure support from their employer) and their past experiences of 
  18 
education may not have been particularly positive (Ball et al. 1999). The probable 
outcome is limited incentives to engage with education and training. 
Demands for more Learning in the Face of Evidence on Over-qualification 
A final factor that adds to the uncertainty of investment in skills is the growing body 
of evidence on demand for qualifications from employers, qualification mismatch and 
over-qualification in the UK labour market. As Francis Green (2009: 17) notes: 
Unfortunately, Britain has long been caught in a low-qualification trap, 
which means that British employers tend to be less likely than in most 
other countries to require their recruits to be educated beyond the 
compulsory school leaving age. Among European countries, only in 
Spain, Portugal and Turkey is there a greater proportion of jobs 
requiring no education beyond compulsory school. There is some way 
to go before British employers place similar demands on the education 
system as are placed in the major competing regions in Europe. 
This relatively limited demand, coupled with the massive expansion of post-
compulsory provision and qualification achievement (Moreau and Leathwood 2006), 
has been the lynchpin of education and training policy across the UK for the last two 
decades. Individuals, who are incentivised through the pull of opportunities to attend 
higher education, do so through the belief that these opportunities will lead to 
‘enhanced earning power associated with a graduate job’ (Boden and Nedeva 2010: 
40). It has led, perhaps rather unsurprisingly, to indications that levels of over-
qualification and qualification mismatch are tending to rise over time. 
Felstead et al. (2007), using data from the Skills Survey suggest that, within 
the overall workforce the proportion of workers who felt they held qualifications at 
levels above those needed to obtain or undertake their current job had increased from 
29.3 per cent in 1986 to 39.6 per cent ten years later. Sutherland (2009) produces even 
more depressing figures using data from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey. He suggests that slightly more than half of the workers in the WERS sample 
felt that their skills (rather than simply qualifications) were either ‘much higher’ (21.3 
per cent) or a ‘bit higher’ (32.6 per cent) than those needed to do their present job. 
These figures may point to another set of negative incentives that are acting on 
individuals when they think about up-skilling, though Sutherland (2009) reports that 
workers at the lower end of the wage distribution were slightly less likely to believe 
themselves over-skilled for their current work. 
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Plainly, the current thrust of government policy – to further increase the stock 
of qualified workers at all levels in the labour market – runs the risk of exacerbating 
this situation. If skills supply continues to outstrip demand, the incentives to learn, 
over time, may decline. As the UKCES (2009: 9) note in their ‘state of the nation’ 
assessment of the labour market: 
The UK does, indeed, have more high skill jobs than high skill people 
(implying we have insufficient people with high-level skills), but this 
gap is actually small relative to most countries. Moreover, the growth 
in our numbers of high skilled people significantly exceeds the growth 
in our numbers of high skilled jobs. The growth in high skilled jobs is 
also occurring at a slower rate than in other countries. This growing 
mismatch is also seen from research which indicates an emerging gap 
between the supply of and demand for graduates as well as an increase 
in the proportion of workers who are ‘over-qualified’ for their current 
jobs. 
Taken together, these findings are lead indicators of potential 
imbalances between the number of skilled jobs and skilled people; 
between the skills available and those in demand – which, in turn, may 
result in ‘over-skilling’ or ‘under-employment’ of skilled workers. 
More is not Enough… 
Furthermore, as the OECD has noted, ‘under-investment in adult learning is due to 
demand-side reasons rather than supply constraints’ (2005: 29). Therefore, simply 
increasing the supply of publicly funded (or part-funded) opportunities to learn may 
not be sufficient to change this picture all that dramatically. As Johnson et al. (2009: 
55) conclude: 
Major surveys have consistently found that career progression and 
accessing better-paid jobs are key motivators for people (including 
lower skilled workers) participating in learning and training. Yet there 
is evidence that undertaking lower level vocational training offers few 
immediate returns to the individual in terms of higher wages. If this 
remains the case, there may be little rational incentive for lower skilled 
workers to participate in such forms of training. Of course, entry-level 
adult learning may act as a first step towards further skills development 
activities that carry a higher wage premium, but there is a need to 
ensure that such progression routes are clearly articulated and that even 
the most basic skills provision is clearly linked to improved job 
performance and/or opportunities for progression. In the more 
immediate term, it is also essential that the qualifications system offers 
vocational awards that can deliver a wage premium for successful 
training completers. 
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Unfortunately, from an official perspective, many of these problems continue 
to remain more or less invisible. In large part, this is due to two factors. First, because 
many of the issues discussed above are deemed to be impossible to tackle within the 
current ideological choices that frame policy, since they would require forms of 
labour market regulation and interventions within the management of the employment 
relationship that are deeply unfashionable and currently ‘off limits’ (Keep 2009, Keep 
et al. 2010, Keep and Mayhew 2010). Second, because policy is based around a 
central, pre-ordained conclusion: more education and training for longer and to a 
higher level is what is needed and because government wants this outcome, everyone 
else will concur. Incentives are implicitly and explicitly assumed to support this 
conclusion, when, even in their own narrowly constructed terms, this may not be the 
case. 
In addition, the current economic downturn seems liable, at least in some 
sectors, to create more struggling companies; more pressure on pay and attempts to 
intensify work thereby leading to more bad jobs; reduced opportunities for 
progression; and pressure on both public and private funding for training lower end 
workers. Rather than the steady improvement that policymakers dream of, things may 
be about to get worse. 
A Policy Bermuda Triangle? 
Each of the elements above, on their own, would be sufficient to cause problems. 
Acting in concert, as a mutually reinforcing matrix of forces, they produce powerful 
reasons why many individuals perceive (often quite correctly) that the incentives to 
learn are weak and hence conclude that it is not worth their while to invest in either 
initial or continuing vocational education and training. Moreover, the implication is 
that the incentives for employers to provide any form of skill formation are weak too. 
The argument above suggests that, having misdiagnosed the fundamental causes of 
low pay and rotten jobs, public policy interventions have lighted upon a solution – up-
skilling – that is relatively ill-fitted to achieving the desired policy goals. How did this 
misdiagnosis and the policy/problem misalignment occur? 
In essence, it can be argued that policymakers’ concerns about the labour 
market and the conditions of employment have collided with a set of fundamental 
ideological assumptions, certainties and ‘no-go zones’ (Keep 2009b). The result is 
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that policymakers in the UK, perhaps most particularly in England, find themselves 
enmeshed in a tangle of conflicting policy paradigms and priorities. Of these, four of 
the most important are: 
1. A continuing belief across much of the mainstream political spectrum (that 
has its roots in the world of Thatcherism) that a ‘flexible’, highly de-
regulated labour market is both a badge of modernity and an important 
source of international competitive advantage in a globalised economy; 
2. A desire to see more jobs, but also better jobs – a desire that mirrors a 
growing concern that the quality of many jobs in the UK labour market is 
poor, wages are often too low and progression opportunities are limited. 
Too many people are trapped in ‘bad’ jobs; 
3. Concern about social inequality, growing and highly persistent income 
inequality and lack of social mobility; 
4. A rejection of collectivist solutions (for example, strong trade unions, 
social partnership or the extension of effective collective bargaining) to 
points 2 and 3 above. This leaves the state with almost sole responsibility 
for leading action to rectify the problems. 
The beliefs embodied in points one and four have helped to bring about the re-
focusing of the explanatory narrative around low pay and poor jobs alluded to in the 
Introduction to this paper. For example, the incidence of low pay could no longer be 
ascribed to weak trade unions and a lack of collective bargaining because stronger 
trade unions and the encouragement of collective bargaining were no longer regarded 
as appropriate forms of public policy intervention. By contrast, poor skills could be 
adduced as a major cause of low pay because public policy deemed education and 
training one of the few remaining areas where public policy interventions were 
legitimate within the labour market. Given the large range of labour market and 
economic policy interventions that are regarded as ideologically impossible or 
repellent, skills have come to represent the bulk of the policy ‘space’ that is left (Keep 
2009b).4 As Brown and Tannock (2009: 383) note, 
Indeed, as the other planks of the welfare state were undermined and 
dismantled, national governments came to regard education as one of 
the most effective remaining instruments of national policy (Green 
1997). Education is commonly described as being pivotal to ‘national 
strategies for securing shares of global markets’ (Slaughter 1998, 
Tannock 2007). 
In many ways education, training and skills have been seen as the means by 
which policymakers can square the circle, particularly in terms of affording them 
                                                 
4
 For more detailed expositions of this set of clashing assumptions, priorities and lines of policy 
development, see Keep (2009b), Keep et al. (2010) and Keep and Mayhew (2010). 
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opportunities for ‘intervention-free intervention’ in the workplace (Keep 2006) and 
‘loser-free redistribution’ in the social and economic spheres (Keep 2009b, Keep and 
Mayhew 2010). However, as time passes and the desired policy outcomes remain 
illusive, there is a growing realisation that the traditional response, that is increases in 
the publicly funded supply of skills, may not, on their own, be sufficient to make a 
significant impact. Despite this, there is a continuing effort on the part of those who 
devised a ‘skills-led’ approach to social and economic problems to promote initiatives 
such as Train to Gain and other adult education and training interventions. 
These government schemes have had relatively limited impact, at large 
expense, in boosting the scale of post-compulsory education and training participation 
and to increase the supply of skills to the adult workforce (see, Ofsted 2008, Pring et 
al. 2009, Keep forthcoming, Wolf et al. forthcoming). On the latter point, given the 
structural circumstances within the labour market that have been adduced above, the 
often quite limited and patchy impact of adult education and training provision aimed 
at workers in lower end jobs is generally unsurprising, but it has caused and continues 
to cause, policymakers considerable heartache. This is because they ascribe an 
importance to skills that many employers do not. As the Confederation of British 
Industry (2009: 20), noted with brutal honesty in a recent report on the future 
structure of the economy: 
The skills profile and hence the supply and cost of some skills, may 
never be ideal in the UK, but labour market flexibility will remain our 
real competitive advantage. 
From an employer’s perspective, many of the features of the UK labour market 
encouraging weak skills formation, are seen as a more powerful source of competitive 
advantage and therefore deemed far more important than skills. In other words, the 
problem of bad jobs is often not to do with the inadequate skills of those who do such 
work, indeed it is often not to do with skills per se at all. Insofar as skill levels are an 
issue, the major problem is often one of limited employer demand for skill, over-
qualification and poor skills utilisation, rather than an inadequate supply (UKCES 
2009). If this analysis is correct, then it will be hard, if not impossible, to solve by 
public policy interventions that are led by traditional skill supply models (Lloyd and 
Mayhew 2010). 
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The Individual 
Indeed, a number of lines of policy development in England are continuing to worsen 
the problems discussed above. One of these has been the emergence of a model of 
agency and intervention that sees the issues in highly individualised terms. Within 
this, the policy goal becomes one of mobilising an individual’s aspiration or moral 
project around self-betterment. Thus, the UK government argued that, ‘we need to 
change the culture in this country around skills, so that when someone complains that 
they are in a low-paid, dead-end job, people ask them what they are doing to improve 
their skills’ (DfES 2007: 1). 
There are several problems with this kind of approach. First, it suggests that 
being low paid is somehow the fault of the individual concerned and simply reflects 
their lack of aspiration or ambition (as witnessed by their lack of skills). 
Unfortunately, leaving aside the fact that many of the low paid are not necessarily all 
that low skilled or qualified (Lloyd et al. 2008), the culture that officials wish to 
change is rooted not in self-defeatism on the part of the low paid, but rather within the 
structural features of the labour market and material and motivational incentives that 
these generate. As Green et al. (2006) explore, in unequal societies and labour 
markets strong positive incentives – particularly of Type 2, but also of Type 1 – will 
not be distributed equitably and that those on the lower rungs of the occupational 
ladder will tend to face weak or non-existent incentives to learn. Successful culture 
change is therefore not likely to be primarily about people ‘bucking up’ their ideas 
and being positive about learning, it will be about efforts to change the incentive 
structure that individual workers face and that is through labour market reform. 
Then there is the question of whether improved skills can get everyone out of 
the large number of low paid jobs that exist (as noted above, 22 per cent of the entire 
workforce, nearly one in three of all jobs occupied by female workers – Lloyd et al. 
2008). The policy implicitly assumes that the supply of better-paid jobs will 
automatically expand if the supply of better-qualified workers rises. The presumption 
appears to be that either low paid, dead-end work would vanish if all workers were 
more skilled, or that it would simply become a short-term way-station on the path to 
better things for those workers who passed through such employment. The realism of 
these beliefs is open to very serious doubt. 
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In particular, this individualised perspective on employability ignores the 
barriers thrown up by the employment context within the organisation / sector / 
occupation, which is often determined by product market strategies, production 
regimes and the prevailing deployment of labour: factors primarily driven by forces 
other than the skills held by lower level employees. Thus the individualised model 
discounts the location of learning and progression within specific styles or models of 
production and people management that can either provide a very varied range of 
experiences, ranging from rich and expansive to narrow and impoverished (Fuller and 
Unwin 2003: 8, Felstead et al. 2009). The individual’s capacity to influence their own 
organisational environment is often very limited indeed and the leverage that publicly 
funded adult up-skilling interventions have on such matters is also open to question 
(see Ofsted 2008, Wolf et al. forthcoming). In other words, you can train away low 
skilled (or more often lowly qualified) stocks of labour, but you cannot train away the 
often low-paid, dead end work environments that such workers often inhabit. 
If Skills are not the Answer … 
Rather than being centrally located in and around the issue of skills, the causes of the 
social and economic problems outlined at the start of this piece appear to be deeply 
embedded in the fabric and structure of our labour market and the pay and reward 
systems, models of occupational identity and certification and progression systems 
that exist within it. Although the chief focus has been on the UK, many of the issues 
explored have echoes across the English-speaking world and, increasingly, within 
those European countries that have experienced labour market de-regulation and rapid 
growth in low-end service sector employment (see Eichhorst and Marx 2009). 
At its most fundamental, the problem that UK policymakers are confronted 
with, but are loath to face head on, is that the evidence of experience (found also in 
countries such as the USA) suggests that neo-liberalism produces losers as well as 
winners in the de-regulated labour market it creates. Indeed, some might go further 
and argue that a labour market configured along the lines recommended by neo-liberal 
doctrine needs a large tier of low end, low paid work in order to function. 
If the creation of a situation where quite large numbers of individuals lose out 
(relatively and sometimes absolutely) is not deemed a problem, then this state of 
affairs need not be a major cause of concern. If, however, policymakers aspire to 
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happy endings for all, then plainly it is. The New Labour experiment was very clearly 
configured around an explanatory narrative that allocated a key role to skills which 
aimed to produce a Cinderella fairytale for the vast majority of workers (see Blair 
2007, Brown 2010). However, a broader analysis of this approach argues that its main 
achievement is to set education and training delivery agencies, teachers and trainers 
up to fail, in that the goals ascribed to education and training policy are not attainable 
through education and training interventions alone (Keep 2006, Keep et al. 2006, 
Keep 2009b, Keep and Mayhew 2010, Lloyd and Mayhew 2010). 
The search for alternative avenues of policy development is too large a topic to 
tackle here. All that can be said is that for new policy directions to stand any chance 
of significant success, they have to embrace the following elements. First, they have 
to come to terms with the structural causation of many of the policy problems that are 
giving rise to concern. Thus, simple exhortation by politicians (of all parties in the 
UK) around the need to transform the aspirations of those in lower socio-economic 
groups is mildly disingenuous in that even if everyone aspired to be middle-class and 
well-paid, the reality – for the foreseeable future – is that about a quarter of all jobs in 
the UK labour market will remain low paid and difficult to progress out of (UKCES 
2010: 6). The result is that the matrix of factors outlined above will only serve to 
reinforce the issue. Thus, simply trying to change aspiration will be difficult and will 
not necessarily achieve much in the longer term, unless it is coupled with wider 
changes to the structure of opportunity (Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007, Hickman 
2009, Harris 2010) and embraces wider regulation and structuring of the labour 
market and the employment relations that take place within it (see Bosch et al. 2010). 
This includes the creation of new forms of wage setting that can help reduce the 
incidence of low paid jobs. 
Second, there is a need to create a stream of policy and activity that aims to 
help change the working and hence learning, environment in many workplaces, not 
least by shifting the central focus of policy from up-skilling individual workers to 
trying to create decent work and more productive and innovative organisations 
(Buchanan 2006, Buchanan et al. 2009). According to the UKCES (2010: 11) in their 
latest report one in five employers are affected by skills gaps. Encouraging employers 
to develop their organisations and workforce through tailored training programmes is 
one solution to overcoming skills gaps and improving workers’ skills. Some other 
countries already have such programmes (Ramstad 2009a) and in some instances they 
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appear able to impact on both productivity and the quality of working life (Ramstad 
2009b). 
Third, within this approach, a more realistic and better-designed set of skills 
interventions is needed. These would revolve around a more limited reliance on state 
subsidy (Type 1b incentives), which may in future simply prove to be no longer 
affordable and a greater emphasis upon building up the capacity of workplaces to 
impart learning through both formal and informal means (see Keep 2010), coupled 
with much more realism about what education and training initiatives and 
programmes can be expected to achieve. 
Brown and Tannock (2009: 389) suggest we [the UK] might do ‘well to turn 
away from our fervent embrace of ‘education only politics’ and rediscover other 
strategies, both old and new, of securing a good standard of living and quality of life 
for all, while taking seriously the limitations of existing models of educational and 
social justice.' At present within the UK, the immediate prospects for such 
developments do not appear good. However, the shock effects of impending public 
spending cuts on education and training, the prospect of up to 40,000 unemployed 
new graduates (Curtis and Lipsett 2009), coupled with pilot initiatives on workforce 
development and skills utilisation by the Scottish government, may just be the catalyst 
to follow these authors suggestion and begin some constructive re-imagining of what 
policy might do to help those in low paid, dead end jobs. 
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